The previous post addressed the legal implications of a federation of data exchange layers and introduced the Estonian-Finnish Bilateral Agreement. This last part of the blog series will take you back to State A and B and the technical issues they need to consider when federating State A’s UXP with State B’s X-Road instance.
As pointed out in the previous post, federating UXP/X-Road instances for cross-border process optimisation relies on a strong bilateral agreement between the respective Governing Authorities (GA) and other relevant governmental bodies.
Addressing the federation of Unified eXchange Platform (UXP)/X-Road1 instances is a fascinating exercise, which despite of the technical challenges, bears the promise of integrating business processes across national or federal borders. It’s easy to imagine federally governed states relying on federated UXP and/or X-Road infrastructure and see how this would be the basis for integrating different jurisdictions’ information systems and services for a user-friendly service delivery. This blog series walks you through the main steps to consider when federating UXP/X-Road national data exchange infrastructure.
Fighting a Crisis with Better Data
The year 2020 gave the world a global crisis - a pandemic caused by a new coronavirus strain named SARS-CoV-2 or COVID-19. The world turned to defeat this crisis with a novel toolkit - data-driven services.
Key highlights:
• clustering solution for monitoring;
• e-mail notification option for monitoring issues;
• more secure monitoring.
Information may be a valuable asset. Do you remember the movie “1917” where Lance Corporal William Schofield takes an incredibly dangerous journey through the front to deliver a message that helps saving thousands of lives? Or, in present context, if your company would be the first one to figure out the correct way to produce COVID-19 vaccine, this information would be of high value, indeed.
Government requires a mix of policy, management, and technology capabilities to create interoperability (Pardo & Burke, 2008a, pg.3).
Key highlights of these changes are:
• support for long cryptographic keys;
• implementation of elliptic curve cryptography;
• security by default.
It is a common belief that quantum computers will pose a security risk to current public key cryptography schemes in use, including remote electronic voting systems. This is mostly because most known online voting protocols make use of cryptosystems that are based on discrete logarithm or factoring problem which are hard for classical computers, but not quantum computers. Although, current quantum computers aren’t complex enough to run these kinds of attacks yet, in a few decades they will be. Thus, there is a good reason to worry about the ballot’s privacy already now.
The world particularly in these unusual times talks all about remote work and jokes about how the coronavirus is actually their digital transformation trigger. In fact, McKinsey writes that about 70 percent of executives from Austria, Germany and Switzerland state, that the current crisis is accelerating their quest for digital transformation.